Directed deadline obligations in agent-based business contracts by Eugénio Oliveira & Henrique Lopes Cardoso
Directed Deadline Obligations in Agent-based
Business Contracts
Henrique Lopes Cardoso and Euge´nio Oliveira
LIACC, DEI / Faculdade de Engenharia, Universidade do Porto
R. Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-465 Porto, Portugal
{hlc,eco}@fe.up.pt
Abstract. There are B2B relationships that presume cooperation in
contract enactment. This issue should be taken into account when model-
ing, for computational handling, contractual commitments through obli-
gations. Deadline obligations have been modeled by considering that
reaching the deadline without compliance brings up a violation. When
modeling commitments in business contracts, directed obligations have
been studied for identifying two agents: the obligation’s bearer and the
counterparty, who may claim for legal action in case of non-compliance.
We argue in favor of a directed deadline obligation approach, taking in-
spiration on international legislation over trade procedures. Our proposal
to model contractual obligations is based on authorizations granted in
specific states of an obligation lifecycle model, which we formalize using
temporal logic and implement in a rule-based system. The performance
of a contractual relationship is supported by a model of flexible dead-
lines, which allow for further cooperation between autonomous agents.
As a result, the decision-making space of agents concerning contractual
obligations is enlarged and becomes richer. We discuss the issues that
agents should take into account in this extended setting.
1 Introduction
In cooperative B2B Virtual Organizations, agents (representing different en-
terprises) share their own competences and skills in a regulated way, through
commitments expressed as norms in contracts. The importance of successfully
proceeding with business demands for flexibility of operations: agents should try
to facilitate the compliance of their partners. This common goal of conduct-
ing a multiparty business is based on the fact that group success also benefits
each agent’s private goals. These goals are not limited to the ongoing business
relationship, but also concern future opportunities that may arise.
While addressing this problem with norms and multi-agent systems, we find
that many approaches to normative multi-agent systems are abstracted away
from their potential application domain. As such, deontic operators are often
taken to have a universal semantics. For instance, deadline obligations are vio-
lated if the obliged action or state is not obtained until the deadline is reached.
We argue that in some domains – such as in business contracts – such an
approach is not desirable. For instance, the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) [1] establishes what parties
may do in case of deadline violations. In some cases they are allowed to fulfill
their obligations after the deadline (Article 48), or even to extend the deadlines
with the allowance of their counterparties. Furthermore, a party may extend his
counterparty’s deadlines (Articles 47 and 63), which denotes a flexible and even
cooperative facet of trade contracts.
In this paper we propose a different approach (in comparison with [2][3][4][5])
to the use of obligations in MAS in the domain of business contracts. Following
a cooperative business performance posture, we argue that obligations should be
directed, and that deadlines should be flexible. We start by reviewing, in section
2, the most typical variations regarding the formalization of obligations, after
which we propose an approach based on directed obligations with deadlines.
The flexibility required when handling temporal restrictions of obligations is
addressed in section 3. The proposed approach is based on authorizations, and we
present a lifecycle for directed obligations with temporal restrictions. In section 4
we investigate the decision-making process of agents concerning authorizations.
Implementation of the proposed model in a rule-based system is discussed in
section 5. Section 6 discusses related work and section 7 concludes.
2 Contractual Obligations
The use of norms in MAS makes use of the well-known deontic operators of obli-
gation, permission and prohibition [6]. In theoretical deontic logic approaches,
these operators are sometimes used to represent abstract general principles (e.g.
it is forbidden to kill). In more applied research, deontic operators are ascribed
either to roles or to particular agents in a system; e.g. Ob(f) indicates that agent
b is obliged to bring about fact f (a state of affairs or an action) – in this case
agent b is said to be the bearer of the obligation.
Also, deontic operators are often made conditional and time constrained.
Considering obligations, the conditional aspect has taken two different perspec-
tives: conditional obligations of the form Ob(f/s), meaning that agent b is obliged
to bring about f when situation s arises; and conditional norms of the form
s → Ob(f), meaning that if s then b is obliged to bring about f . As for the
temporal aspect of deontic operators, deadlines (either time references or more
generally defined as states of affairs) are typically employed for stipulating the
validity of the operator: Ob(f, d) is a deadline obligation indicating that agent b
is obliged to bring about f before d.
We will base the following discussion on the obligation deontic operator, as it
is the most important operator to represent trade relationships in B2B contracts.
The meaning of deontic operators has been studied, mainly regarding the use of
deadlines (e.g. [2]). Regarding deadline obligations, the usual approach to their
semantics is to consider the following entailments1:
– Ob(f , d) ∧ (f B d) |= Fulfb(f , d) — If the fact to bring about occurs before
the deadline, the agent has fulfilled his obligation.
– Ob(f , d) ∧ (d B f ) |= Violb(f , d) — If the deadline occurs before the fact to
bring about, the agent has violated his obligation.
The introduction of Fulf and Viol enables reasoning about the respective
situations. The implementation of this semantics using forward-chaining rules
has been studied in [3]. Although intuitive, this semantics is quite rigid in that
violations are all defined in a universal way (discounting the fact that different
norms can respond to violations in different ways).
The analysis of contracts brings into discussion the notion of directed obliga-
tions [8]. Obligations are seen as directed from a bearer (responsible for fulfilling
the obligation) to a counterparty. Some authors [4] define the very notion of con-
tractual obligation as an obligation with an “obligor” (bearer) and an “obligee”
(counterparty). The relationship between these two roles in a directed obligation
has been studied, giving rise to two different theories. The benefit theory pro-
motes the fact that the counterparty of an obligation is intended to benefit from
its fulfillment (see [8] for a benefit theory perspective of directed obligations). A
more relevant approach in which contracts are concerned – the claimant theory
– takes the stance that obligations are interpreted as claims from counterparties
to bearers (see [5] for a claimant theory support).
In general, claimant approaches are based on the following definition for
directed obligation (adapted from [5]): Ob,c(f ) =def Ob(f ) ∧ (¬f ⇒ Pc(lab)). A
directed obligation from agent b towards agent c to bring about f means that b
is obliged to bring about f and if b does not bring about f then c is permitted
to initiate legal action against b. The concept of legal action is rather vague.
A similar approach is taken in [9], where agent c is said to be authorized to
repair the situation in case b does not fulfill his obligation. Repair actions in-
clude demanding further actions from b; e.g., c may demand compensation for
damages. It is interesting to note that such definitions are careful enough to
base the claims of the counterparty on the non-fulfillment of the obligation, not
on its violation. In fact, these definitions do not include deadlines, which are
the basis for violation detection. Another significant issue is the discretionary
nature of the counterparty’s reaction (he is permitted or authorized), instead of
an automatic response based on the non-fulfillment of the bearer2.
1 In the following formulae we will follow linear temporal logic (LTL) [7], with a
discrete time model. Let x = (s0, s1, s2, ...) be a timeline, defined as a sequence
of states si. The syntax x |= p reads that p is true in timeline x. We write xk
to denote state sk of x, and x
k |= p to mean that p is true at state xk. We
use a weak version of the before LTL operator B, where q is not mandatory:
x |= (p B q) iff ∃j (x j |= p ∧ ∀k<j (x k |= ¬q)).
2 As in automatic violation detection approaches based on deadlines, complemented
with the definition of violation reaction norms.
We propose the use of directed deadline obligations as the basis for defining
contractual obligations: Ob,c(f, d). In section 3 we describe a model for flexible
obligation violation, based on the principle that the deadline is meant to indi-
cate when the counterparty is authorized to react to the non-fulfillment of an
obligation directed to him. A possible reaction is to declare the obligation as
violated, but there are other means to settle the matter, to the benefit of both
involved parties. An extension of directed (contractual) obligations with tempo-
ral restrictions is also introduced in [4], but that approach is based on a rigid
model of violations, in that they are automatically obtained at the deadline.
2.1 Directed Deadline Obligations
Our proposal combines directed [5][8] and deadline [2] obligations. Although this
has been done in the past (e.g. [4]), in our approach deadlines have a distinct
role in the definition of obligations. In section 3 we detail such a role.
Directed deadline obligations take the form Ob,c(f, d), meaning that agent b
is obliged towards agent c to bring about f before d. We do not make obligations
conditional (as in [4]), because we assume they are obtained from conditional
norms: rules prescribing obligations when certain situations arise.
We consider that if fact f is not yet the case when deadline d arises, the
obligation is not yet violated, but is in a state where the counterparty is autho-
rized to take some action. We emphasize the case for a deadline violation (as
opposed to obligation violation). This comprises a flexible approach to handling
non-ideal situations: each deadline violation is different, as each may have a dif-
ferent impact on the ongoing business, and each occurs between a specific pair
of agents with a unique trust relationship.
Some evidence from the CISG convention [1] led us to this approach:
Article 48: (1) [...] the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy
at his own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so
without unreasonable delay [...]; (2) If the seller requests the buyer to make
known whether he will accept performance and the buyer does not comply with
the request within a reasonable time, the seller may perform within the time
indicated in his request. [...]
This means that even though a deadline has been violated, the bearer may
still be entitled to fulfill the same obligation. This kind of delay is also called
a grace period : a period beyond a due date during which an obligation may be
met without penalty or cancellation.
Figure 1 illustrates the intuitive semantics of a directed deadline obligation.
The shaded area represents the period of time within which the achievement
of f will certainly bring a fulfillment of the obligation. The region to the right
of d indicates that counterparty c is entitled to react if f is not accomplished;
however, as long as no reaction is taken, b can still fulfill his obligation.
Therefore, a deadline violation brings a counterparty authorization. Autho-
rizations are taken into account in the normative system by having rules and
Fig. 1. Directed obligation with deadline.
norms that are based on the materialization of such authorizations. The available
options are discussed in section 3.
2.2 Livelines and Deadlines
The deadline approach is often taken to be appropriate for specifying temporal
restrictions on obligations. However, in certain cases a time window should be
provided. In international trade transactions, for instance, storage costs may be
relevant. Also, perishable goods should be delivered only when they are needed,
not before. This is why in CISG [1] we have:
Article 52: (1) If the seller delivers the goods before the date fixed, the buyer
may take delivery or refuse to take delivery.
Therefore, anticipated fulfillments are not always welcome. We find it neces-
sary to include a variation of directed deadline obligations, to which we add a
liveline: a time reference after which the obligation should be fulfilled. In this
case we have Ob,c(f, l, d): agent b is obliged towards agent c to bring about f be-
tween l (a liveline) and d (a deadline). Figure 2 illustrates the intuitive semantics
of this kind of obligation. The shaded area represents the period of time within
which the achievement of f will certainly bring a fulfillment of the obligation. If
f is accomplished before l, however, it may be the case that c is not willing to
accept such a fulfillment, or at least that he may not be happy about it – the
region to the left of l entitles c to react if f is accomplished. The region to the
right of d is as with (simple) directed deadline obligations.
Fig. 2. Directed obligation with liveline and deadline.
We escape from an approach with a fixed time reference for obligation fulfill-
ment (an obligation for bringing about f at time t), which would be suggested
by the term “date fixed” in CISG’s Article 52 transcription above. We find it
more convenient to define a fixed date as an interval, say, from the beginning till
the end of a specific date3.
3 Managing Liveline and Deadline Violations
After we have advocated, in the preceding section, a counterparty authorization
approach to deadline violations, in this section we address the issue of what
kind of actions the counterparty may take in such situations, and what are their
effects on the obligation whose deadline has been violated. The same accounts
to directed obligations with both livelines and deadlines.
The successful enactment of a contract is dependent on the need to make
contractual provisions performable in a flexible way. The importance of having
flexible trade procedures is apparent, once again, in the CISG convention [1]:
Article 47: (1) The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable
length for performance by the seller of his obligations.
Article 63: (1) The seller may fix an additional period of time of reasonable
length for performance by the buyer of his obligations.
These articles emphasize, once more, the need for flexible deadlines. Note that
the counterparty’s benevolence on conceding an extended deadline to the bearer
does not prescribe a new obligation; instead, the same obligation may be fulfilled
within a larger time window. Furthermore, it is also in the counterparty’s best
interest that this option is available, given the importance of reaching success in
the performance of the contract.
In some other cases, a party may decide that the non-fulfillment of an obli-
gation should be handled in a more strict way. The CISG convention specifies
conditions for cancelling a contract in case of breach:
Article 49: (1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure
by the seller to perform any of his obligations [...] amounts to a fundamental
breach of contract; [...]; (2) However, in cases where the seller has delivered
the goods, the buyer loses the right to declare the contract avoided unless he
does so: (a) in respect of late delivery, within a reasonable time after he has
become aware that delivery has been made; [...]
Article 64: (1) The seller may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure
by the buyer to perform any of his obligations [...] amounts to a fundamental
breach of contract; [...]; (2) However, in cases where the buyer has paid the
price, the seller loses the right to declare the contract avoided unless he does
so: (a) in respect of late performance by the buyer, before the seller has become
aware that performance has been rendered; [...]
3 This is actually a matter of time granularity.
These articles allow contract termination in both non-performance and late
performance cases. However, the second case is limited to the awareness of the
offended party.
From these excerpts we can distinguish two types of reactions to non-fulfillments:
a smoother one (from articles 47, 48 and 63), in which parties are willing to re-
cover from an initial failure to conform to an obligation; and a stricter one
(articles 49 and 64), where the failure is not self-containable anymore. Based on
these options, we propose a model for a directed deadline obligation lifecycle.
3.1 Authorizations on Violations
Following the discussion above, we identify the possible states for an obligation,
together with the elements we shall use to signal some of those states (when
obtained, these elements are supposed to persist over time):
– inactive: the obligation is not yet in effect, but will eventually be prescribed
by a norm;
– active: the obligation was prescribed by a norm – Ob,c(f, d) or Ob,c(f, l, d)
– pending : the obligation may be fulfilled from now on;
– liveline violation: the fact being obliged has been brought ahead of time –
LViolb,c(f , l , d)
– deadline violation: the fact being obliged should have been brought already
– DViolb,c(f , d) or DViolb,c(f , l , d)
– fulfilled : the obligation was fulfilled – Fulfb,c(f , d) or Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
– violated : the obligation was violated and cannot be fulfilled anymore – Violb,c(f , d)
or Violb,c(f , l , d)
Starting with the simpler case of directed deadline obligations, we identify
the (absolute) fulfillment case:
– Ob,c(f , d) ∧ (f B d) |= Fulfb,c(f , d)
Then we state the consequence of reaching a deadline with no achievement
of the obligated fact:
– Ob,c(f , d) ∧ (d B f ) |= DViolb,c(f , d)
Note that, differently from the usual approach, we set the obligation to have
a violated deadline – DViolb,c(f , d) – but not to be violated in itself.
The counterparty’s reaction to a deadline violation will only change the obli-
gation’s state if the option is to deem the obligation as violated, by denouncing
this situation. For this we introduce the element Denc,b(f , d), which is a de-
nounce from agent c towards agent b regarding the failure of the latter to comply
with his obligation to bring about f before d. Since we consider the achievement
of facts to be common knowledge, a party may only denounce the non-fulfillment
of an obligation while that obligation is not fulfilled yet4:
4 This is a simplification of what articles 49 and 64 of CISG suggest.
– DViolb,c(f , d) ∧ (f B Denc,b(f , d)) |= Fulfb,c(f , d)
– DViolb,c(f , d) ∧ (Denc,b(f , d) B f ) |= Violb,c(f , d)
Figure 3 illustrates, by means of a state transition diagram, the lifecycle of di-
rected deadline obligations. We take obligations as being prescribed from condi-
tional norms; the confirmation of the norm’s condition will change the prescribed
obligation’s state from inactive to active. The obligation is also automatically
pending, since it may be legitimately fulfilled right away.
Fig. 3. Lifecycle of a directed deadline obligation.
Fig. 4. Lifecycle of a directed obligation with liveline and deadline.
Figure 4 contains the state transition diagram for directed obligations with
livelines and deadlines. In this case, the obligation will only be pending when
l arises, since only then it may be fulfilled in a way that is compliant with the
terms of the contract. We define the following relations:
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ (f B l) |= LViolb,c(f , l , d)
– LViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ (l B Denc,b(f , l , d)) |= Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
– LViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ (Denc,b(f , l , d) B l) |= Violb,c(f , l , d)
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ (l B f ) ∧ (f B d) |= Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ (d B f ) |= DViolb,c(f , l , d)
– DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ (f B Denc,b(f , l , d)) |= Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
– DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ (Denc,b(f , l , d) B f ) |= Violb,c(f , l , d)
We have now two kinds of temporal violations: liveline violations of the form
LViolb,c(f , l , d) and deadline violations of the form DViolb,c(f , l , d). In both
cases a denounce may establish the obligation as violated, if issued before l or
f , respectively.
3.2 Smoother Authorizations on Violations
The diagrams in figures 3 and 4 only include events that produce a change in
an obligation’s state. The denouncement of the non-fulfillment of an obligation,
making it violated and consequently not fulfillable any longer, denotes a situation
in which a bearer’s attempt to fulfill the obligation will no longer be significant to
the counterparty, and thus a consummated violation should be handled according
to applicable norms. These may bring sanctions, further obligations or ultimately
a contract cancellation, as in articles 49 and 64 of CISG.
In order to accommodate less strict situations (see articles 47, 48 and 63
of CISG), we consider that in liveline and deadline violation states, while the
obligation can still be fulfilled, the counterparty may react to the non-ideal
situation. These possibilities are not illustrated in figures 3 and 4, since they do
not bring state changes. For instance, in international trade transactions storage
costs may be relevant. The counterparty may therefore be authorized to demand
for payment of storage costs from an early compliant bearer. Another example
for the deadline violation case:
Article 78: If a party fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears,
the other party is entitled to interest on it [...]
While obligation state transitions are processed with appropriate rules (in-
cluding rules that take denounces into account), authorizations expressing the
counterparty’s right to demand for compensation are handled by the system
through appropriate norms, which may be defined in a contract basis.
4 Decision-making on Directed Deadline Obligations
The authorization approach described above enriches the decision-making space
of agents concerning norms. Since commitments can be violated, agents (as hu-
man delegates) may decide whether to fulfill them or not. Furthermore, because
the violation state is determined by the counterparty’s choice to denounce this
situation, both parties associated with a directed obligation are in a position to
decide over it after the deadline.
In order to model the decision making process, we need to assess each agent’s
valuations on the obligation states and facts they are able to bring about. We will
write va(f) and va(S) to denote the valuation agent a makes of fact f or state
S, respectively (similarly to the valuation model used in [10]). When valuating
an obligation’s state (namely a fulfillment or a violation), agents should take
into account two different sorts of effects. First, since an obligation is taken to
be a part of a wider contract that should benefit all participants, the obligation
cannot be taken in isolation, as its fulfillment or violation may trigger further
commitments. Second, an agent’s reputation is affected by whether or not he
stands for his commitments. In the following we assume that an agent is capable
of anticipating and evaluating the consequences of his actions within a contract.
For an obligation Ob,c(f, d) we have the following valuation constraints for b:
vb(Ob,c(f, d)) < 0 : an obligation is a burden to its bearer
vb(f) < vb(Ob,c(f, d)) : there is a heavier cost associated with bringing about f
vb(Fulfb,c(f , d)) > 0 : b gains from fulfilling his obligation
vb(Violb,c(f , d)) < 0 : b loses from violating his obligation
The notions of gain and loss for the bearer extend to outside this obligation.
For instance, fulfilling an obligation may bring an entitlement (a new obligation
where the bearer becomes the counterparty). Violating an obligation will poten-
tially bring penalties to the bearer, hence the negative valuation. In both cases,
the reputation of agent b is affected (positively or negatively). Unlike in [10], we
do not impose that vb(Violb,c(f , d)) < vb(f ) + vb(Fulfb,c(f , d)). An agent may
be able to exploit a contract flaw by considering that in a specific situation he
is better off violating his obligation than fulfilling it. Of course that even if the
above condition holds, agent b may still choose to violate his obligations, be-
cause of other conflicting goals: he may lose with respect to the outcome of this
contract, but may possibly win across contracts.
As for the counterparty c, we have:
vc(Ob,c(f, d)) > 0 : an obligation is an asset for the counterparty
vc(f) > vc(Ob,c(f, d)) : c benefits from f
vc(Fulfb,c(f , d)) ≤ 0 : c may acquire obligations after fulfillment
vc(Violb,c(f , d)) ≥ 0 : c may obtain compensations after violation
Note that both fulfillments and violations may bring no value if they have
no further consequences in the contract.
In a rough attempt to model the decision making process of a counterparty
of an obligation whose deadline was violated, we could state that he should
denounce (and thus obtain the obligation’s violation) if5
vc(f ) + vc(Fulfb,c(f , d)) < vc(Violb,c(f , d)).
We consider that valuations may possibly vary with time. Were that not the
case, the above condition would only need to be checked right after d, at which
point the counterparty would either denounce or decide to wait indefinitely for
the bearer to fulfill his obligation. For instance, we believe that it makes sense
to think of vc(f) as possibly decreasing with time (like a resource that should
be available but is not yet). Even when the above condition does not hold, the
counterparty may still prefer to tolerate the less preferred situation of failure for
matters of conflicting goals (just as with the bearer).
Until now we have discussed the possibility of agents (both bearers and coun-
terparties) deciding on breach over compliance (either by assessing intra-contract
consequences or by inter-contract conflicts). But in scenarios enriched with social
features agents can exploit, it may be the case that agents decide to behave coop-
eratively even when they have to bear a contained disadvantage. In such settings,
more than being altruistic, agents may try to enhance their trust awareness in
the community, from which they will benefit in future interactions or contracts.
5 We assume there is no cost associated with the denouncing action.
5 Implementation and Practical Issues
The logical relationships expressed above provide us a formalism to define di-
rected deadline obligations. However, in order to monitor contracts at run-time,
we need to ground this semantics into a reasoning engine capable of respond-
ing to events in a timely fashion. That is, elements describing obligation states
should allow us to reason about those states as soon as they occur.
A natural choice we have made before [3] is the use of a rule-based infer-
ence engine, with which the following (forward-chaining) rules can be defined to
implement the semantics of directed obligations with livelines and deadlines6:
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ f ∧ ¬l → LViolb,c(f , l , d)
– LViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ l ∧ ¬Denc,b(f , l , d)→ Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
– LViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧Denc,b(f , l , d) ∧ ¬l → Violb,c(f , l , d)
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ l ∧ ¬LViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ f ∧ ¬d → Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ d ∧ ¬f → DViolb,c(f , l , d)
– DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ f ∧ ¬Denc,b(f , l , d)→ Fulfb,c(f , l , d)
– DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧Denc,b(f , l , d) ∧ ¬f → Violb,c(f , l , d)
With this approach, we assume an immediate assertion of facts and deadlines
when they come into being. Furthermore, rules are expected to be evaluated in
every working memory update (e.g. right after a fact is asserted), in order to
produce the indicated conclusions, which are added to the normative state in a
cumulative fashion. To detect the moment at which the before relation holds, we
translated terms of the form (e1 B e2) into a conjunction e1 ∧ ¬e2. The fourth
rule demanded for a more careful construction, since we had two consecutive
before relations – we needed to ensure that there was no liveline violation when
having both l and f .
5.1 Reasoning with Time
In business contracts it is common to have deadlines that are dependent on the
fulfillment date of other obligations. Therefore, instead of having fixed (absolute)
dates, these may at times be relative, calculated according to other events. CISG
[1] expresses this by saying that dates can be determinable from the contract:
Article 33: The seller must deliver the goods: (a) if a date is fixed by or deter-
minable from the contract, on that date; (b) if a period of time is fixed by or
determinable from the contract, at any time within that period [...]
Article 59: The buyer must pay the price on the date fixed by or determinable
from the contract [...]
6 The simpler case of directed deadline obligations is a simplification over these rules.
It is therefore useful to timestamp each event: facts, fulfillments and viola-
tions. For that purpose, Fulfb,c(f , l , d)t will be used to indicate that b has fulfilled
at time point t its obligation towards c to obtain f between l and d; similarly
for Violb,c(f , l , d)t . Since a fact itself has now a timestamp attribute, for ease
of reading we will write fact f achieved at time point t as Fact(f )t . A denounce
will also be written Denc,b(f , l , d)t .
Norms will be based on these elements and on their time references in order
to prescribe other obligations with relative deadlines. For instance,
Fulfb,c(Deliver(x , q), , )t → Oc,b(Pay(price), t , t + 10 )
means that once agent b has fulfilled his obligation to deliver q units of x to
agent c, the latter is obliged to pay the former within a period of 10 time units.
5.2 Re-implementing Rules
We also need to update our rules in order to stamp each generated event. In
fact, having timestamps also allows us to implement such rules in a way that
has a closer reading to the LTL before operator:
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ Fact(f )t ∧ t < l → LViolb,c(f , l , d)
– LViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ l ∧ ¬(Denc,b(f , l , d)u ∧ u < l)→ Fulfb,c(f , l , d)l
– LViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧Denc,b(f , l , d)u ∧ u < l → Violb,c(f , l , d)u
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ Fact(f )t ∧ l < t ∧ t < d → Fulfb,c(f , l , d)t
– Ob,c(f , l , d) ∧ d ∧ ¬(Fact(f )t ∧ t < d)→ DViolb,c(f , l , d)
– DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧ Fact(f )t ∧ ¬(Denc,b(f , l , d)u ∧ u < t)→ Fulfb,c(f , l , d)t
– DViolb,c(f , l , d) ∧Denc,b(f , l , d)u ∧ ¬(Fact(f )t ∧ t < u)→ Violb,c(f , l , d)u
This kind of approach has the benefit of relaxing the rule evaluation policy:
rules do not have to be evaluated after each working memory update, since we
are checking the timestamps of each event (see also [3]).
5.3 Example Contract
Considering a two-party business scenario, a contract should be beneficial for
both involved parties. Therefore, both are obliged to bring about certain facts
(e.g. payments or deliveries) in specific situations, and those facts should benefit
the obligations’ counterparties. The contract will typically specify remedies for
breach situations (such as those pointed out at CISG). For the sake of illustra-
tion, we present a possible buyer-supplier contract: agent S commits to supply
agent B, whenever he orders, good X for 7.5 per unit. The norms below define
this particular contractual relationship. Agent S is supposed to deliver the or-
dered goods between 3 to 5 days after the order (norm n1), and agent B shall
pay within 30 days (norm n2). Furthermore, if agent B does not pay in due time,
he will incur in a penalty consisting of an obligation to pay an extra 10% on the
order total (norm n3). Finally, if agent S violates his obligation to deliver, the
contract will be canceled (norm n4).
(n1) Fact(Order(X , q))w → OS ,B (Deliver(X , q),w + 3 ,w + 5 )
(n2) FulfS ,B (Deliver(X , q), l , d)w → OB,S (Pay(q ∗ 7 .5 ),w ,w + 30 )
(n3) DViolB,S (Pay(p), l , d)→ OB,S (Pay(p ∗ 0 .10 ), d , d + 30 )
(n4) ViolS ,B (Deliver(X , q), l , d)w → Cancel contract
Note that the interest applied on payments is automatic once a deadline
violation is detected (norm n3). On the other hand, a contract cancellation (norm
n4) requires that agent B denounces the inability of agent S to fulfill the delivery.
It is therefore up to agent B whether to wait further and accept a delayed delivery
or not. If the agreed upon contract conditions are important enough, allowing a
counterparty deviation (and hence taking a cooperative attitude regarding the
compliance of the contract) may be a good decision.
Different kinds of situations may be easily modeled using this kind of norms.
Moreover, using flexible deadlines also ensures a degree of freedom for agents
to make decisions in the execution phase of contracts, which is important for
dealing with business uncertainty.
6 Related Work
Most implementations of norms in multi-agent systems ignore the need for having
directed obligations from bearers to counterparties. The most likely reason for
this is that in those approaches obligations are seen as (implicitly) directed from
an agent to the normative system itself. It is up to the system (e.g. an electronic
organization [11] or an electronic institution [12]) to detect violations and to
enforce the norms which are designed into the environment (in some cases they
are even regimented in such a way that violation is not possible). On the contrary,
our flexible approach towards an Electronic Institution allows agents to define
the norms that will regulate their mutual commitments.
Other authors have proposed different lifecycles for commitments and deon-
tic operators. Directed social commitments are modeled in [13], in the context of
dialogical frameworks. Violated commitments resort to their cancellation, which
may bring sanctions. An interesting issue that is explicit in the model is the
possibility for the bearer to cancel his commitment, allowing the counterparty
to apply sanctions; also, updating is allowed through cancellation of the com-
mitment and creation of a new one. A more compact model is presented in [14],
also considering the possibility to update commitments. However, fulfillment and
violation are not dealt with explicitly in this model; instead, a commitment is
discharged when fulfilled, or else may be canceled.
Taking a cooperative approach to contract fulfillment, in [15] an obligation
lifecycle model includes states that are used in a contract fulfillment protocol.
Agents communicate about their intentions to comply with obligations, and
in this sense an obligation can be refused or accepted. After being accepted,
the obligation may be canceled or complied with. These states are obtained
according to the performance of a contractual relationship. Our model should
also require that agents communicate their intentions regarding an obligation
with a violated deadline. In fact, CISG’s Article 48 seems to go in this direction,
in order to protect the bearer’s efforts toward a late fulfillment of the obligation.
The need to identify two opposite roles in deontic operators is not exclusive
of obligations. In [5] the concept of directed permission is described on the basis
of interference and counter-performance. If a party is permitted by another to
bring about some fact, the latter is not allowed to interfere with the attempt
of the former to achieve that fact. The authors also sustain a relation between
directed obligations and directed permissions: Ob,c(f) → Pb,c(f), that is, if an
agent b has an obligation towards an agent c, then b is permitted (by c) to bring
about the obliged fact and c is not permitted to interfere. This is very important
in international trade transactions, especially when storage costs can be high.
Some evidence from CISG [1] brings us once more the same insight:
Article 53: The buyer must pay the price for the goods and take delivery of
them [...]
Article 60: The buyer’s obligation to take delivery consists: (a) in doing all the
acts which could reasonably be expected of him in order to enable the seller to
make delivery; and (b) in taking over the goods.
In this case the permission is described in terms of an obligation of the
counterparty (the buyer).
Our model of directed obligations with livelines and deadlines has some con-
nections with research on real-time systems, where a time-value function valuates
a task execution outcome depending on the time when it is obtained. Soft real-
time systems use soft deadlines: obtaining the result after the deadline has a
lower utility. In contrast, for hard real-time systems the deadline is crisp: after
it, the result has no utility at all, and missing the deadline can have serious
consequences. Our approach seems to be soft with a hard-deadline discretion-
ally declared by the counterparty of the task to achieve. Deadline goals are also
analyzed in [16] in the context of goal-directed and decision-theoretic planning.
Goals are given a temporal extent and can be partially satisfied according to
this temporal component. The authors propose a horizon time point somewhere
after the deadline, after which there will be no benefit in achieving the goal. In
our case the horizon is not static, but can be defined by the counterparty.
A model for commitment valuations, on which we have based our decision-
making prospect, has been proposed in [10]. However, while their work is centered
on checking correctness of contracts, we focus on valuations in the course of a
contract execution. We do not assume that a contract is correct from a fairness
point of view. This difference in concerns has brought divergent considerations
when valuating fulfillment and violation states.
Other authors have studied agent decision-making regarding norm compli-
ance. For instance, violation games, put in perspective of a game-theoretic ap-
proach to normative multi-agent systems in [17], model the interactions between
an agent and the normative system that is responsible to detect violations and
sanction them accordingly. That line of research analyses how an agent can vi-
olate obligations without being sanctioned. In our case, while we assume that
temporal violations are always detected, we explore decision-making from the
point of view of both the bearer and the counterparty of a directed obligation.
7 Conclusions
In cooperative B2B Virtual Organizations, contracts specify, through obligations,
the interdependencies between different partners, and provide legal options to
which parties can resort in case of conflict. However, when this joint activity
aims at pursuing a common goal, the successful performance of business benefits
all involved parties. Therefore, when developing automated monitoring tools,
one should take into account that agents may be cooperative enough to allow
counterparties’ deviations.
Taking this into account, in this paper we have presented a novel model for
contractual obligations – directed deadline obligations. Following a claimant the-
ory approach, the directed aspect concerns the need to identify the agent who
will be authorized to react in case of non-fulfillment. We started from previ-
ous theoretical approaches to model such authorizations, and developed a more
concrete formalization by linking authorizations with a flexible model of dead-
lines. Obligation violations are now dependent on the counterparty motivation
to claim them. We have also considered in our model smoother authorizations.
Our approach is based on real-world evidence from business contracts (namely
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods),
which denotes a flexible and even cooperative facet of trade contracts. This facet
extends to the concept of B2B Virtual Organizations, wherein different parties
come together to share a business goal that is achievable through the cooperative
fulfillment of a common contract.
We addressed the important issue of agent decision-making, which is enriched
by our model of authorizations. Both parties involved in a directed deadline obli-
gation may have a say regarding its violation. When considering obligations as
interlinked through norms in a contract, agents should evaluate the consequences
of fulfillment and violation states as prescribed in the contract. Furthermore,
in “socially rich” environments, agents should explore the value of future re-
lationships by enhancing their perceived trustworthiness and predisposition to
facilitate compliance, something that is made possible by our directed deadline
obligations approach.
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